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I 
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
The parties to this Appeal are the Plaintiff/Appellant Dee 
Henshaw, and the Defendant/Appellee the Utah Department of 
Transportation, (hereinafter, "UDOT"). 
n 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page No, 
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL: 1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS: 1-3 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: 3-4 
Cases: 3-4 
Rules: . . 4 
Statutes: 4 
Treatises • 4 
JURISDICTION: 4 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL: 4-6 
Issues of Fact: 4-5 
Standard of Appellate Review of Issues of Fact ... 5 
Issues of Law: 5 
Standard of Appellate Review for Issues of Law ... 5-6 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES: 6-7 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 7-18 
NATURE OF THE CASE: 7 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL COURT LEVEL: 7-11 
1 
Page No. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT: 11 
STATEMENT OF FACTS: 12-18 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT: 19 
ARGUMENT: 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BOTH AS A MATTER OF FACT AND 
AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT GRANTED UDOT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. THE TRIAL COURT ALSO ERRED 
AS A MATTER OF FACT AND AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT 
GRANTED SWEENEY »S MOTION TO DISMISS 19-38 
POINT I 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST IN THIS CASE 
WHICH PRECLUDED THE TRIAL COURT FROM ENTERING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF UDOT 19-23 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
GRANTING UDOT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 23-32 
A. MR. HENSHAW'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION STATES 
A CLAIM AGAINST UDOT 24-25 
B. MR. HENSHAW'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION STATES 
A CLAIM AGAINST UDOT 25-26 
C. MR. HENSHAW'S FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT 
BARRED BY THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 26-28 
D. MR. HENSHAW'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT 
TIME BARRED 28-30 
E. MR. HENSHAW'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT 
TIME BARRED 30-31 
F. MR. HENSHAW'S CAUSE OF ACTION FOR CONSPIRACY 
TO DEFRAUD IS NOT TIME BARRED 31-32 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE ARE 
NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRESENT IN THIS 
CASE WHICH PRECLUDED THE TRIAL COURT FROM ENTERING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF SWEENEY 32-35 
2 
Page No 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT MR. 
HENSHAW'S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT AROSE 
IN JULY 1995 32-34 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT MR. 
HENSHAW'S CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SWEENEY FOR 
FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT ACCRUED NO LATER THAN 
JULY 1985 34-35 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING 
THAT SWEENY WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW 35-38 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 38 
m 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases i 
Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 
229 (Utah 1987) 6, 20 
Bays v. Haven. 777 P.d 562 Wash. Alp. 324 (1989) 26 
Butcher v. Gilrov. 744 P.2d 311, 314 (Utah App. 1987) . 36 
Chelan County V. Wilson. 744 P.2d 1106, 
49 Wash Alp. 628 (1987) 26 
Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins. Co.. 714 P.2d 648, 649 
(Utah 1986) 5 
Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark. 755 P.2d 750, 752, 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) 5, 6, 
Mevers v. McDonald. 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981) 36 
Mountain American Credit Union v. McClellan, 
854 P.2d 590, 591 (Utah App. 1993) 32 
Regional Agency. Inc., v. Reichart, 830 P.2d 252 
(Utah 1992) 8, 14 
Rice v. Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 
456 P.2d 159, 163 (1969) 36 
3 
Page No. 
Vencent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 105, 
107 (Utah 1981) 35 
Statutes: 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amended, § 63-30-3 28 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, § 78-2-2 (3)(j) 4 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, § 78-2-2(4) 4 
Rules: 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12 32 
Treatises: 
92 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser, § 284, § 285 25-26 
IV 
JURISDICTION 
Original jurisdiction of this matter was vested in the Utah 
Supreme Court pursuant to Section 78-2-2 (3)(j), Utah Code Ann. 
1953, as amended. Jurisdiction is now vested in this Court 
pursuant to the provisions of § 78-2-2(4) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as 
amended. 
V 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues on appeal are as follows: 
Issues of Fact 
1. Did the trial court err in concluding that there were 
4 
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cause of action against Sweeney for Breach of Contract arose 
in July 1985? 
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inducement accrued no later than July 1985? 
Standard of Review 
When reviewing an appeal from summary judgment, the 
appellate court must construe the facts and view the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the losing party. Geneva Pipe Co. v. 
S & H Ins. Co.. 714 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1986); Lucky Seven Rodeo 
Corp. v. Clark. 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah Ct. App.1988). 
Issues of Law 
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in granting 
UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment? 
2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in granting 
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Standard of Review 
Because a summary judgment motion is granted as a matter of 
law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(A) 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a Judgment rendered by Judge Leslie 
Lewis in favor of Defendant Ireene Sweeney granting her motion to 
dismiss Mr, Henshaw's Complaint, and an appeal from a grant of 
summary judgment entered by Judge J. Dennis Frederick granting 
UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(B) 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL COURT LEVEL 
1. Mr. Henshaw filed his Complaint against UDOT and 
Sweeney on February 6, 1992. 
2. On March 9, 1992, Defendant UDOT filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
3. On March 23, 1992, Mr. Henshaw filed an Amended 
Complaint. 
4. On March 30, 1992, Defendant Sweeney filed a Motion to 
Dismiss. 
5. A hearing was scheduled for UDOT's Motion and Sweeney's 
Motion. 
6. Judge Lewis granted Sweeney's Motion. 
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7. However, on June 4, 1992, Judge Lewis took under 
advisement UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
8. On June 23, 1992, Judge Lewis ruled that UDOT's Motion 
for Summary Judgment was rendered moot by an order entered on 
June 22, 1992, dismissing with prejudice all counts of Mr. 
Henshaw's Complaint. 
9. On July 23, 1992, Judge Lewis set aside the June 22, 
1992 Order. 
10. On October 23, 1992, Judge Lewis sent a letter 
requesting that the parties state whether they object to Judge 
Lewis remaining on the case pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision in Regional Agency, Inc., v. Reichart. Pursuant to 
that letter, counsel for Mr. Henshaw, requested that Judge Lewis 
recuse herself from this case and requested that another judge be 
assigned to the case. 
11. Judge Lewis refused to rule on UDOT's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, taken under advisement on June 4, 1992, and on 
March 4, 1994, Judge Murphy assigned the case to Judge Frederick. 
12. On March 29, 1994, Judge Frederick denied UDOT's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
13. On April 19, 1994, Judge Frederick signed an order 
directing UDOT to file an answer to Mr. Henshaw's Amended 
Complaint within ten days. 
14. On May 5, 1994, Judge Frederick signed and entered a 
Default Judgment against UDOT. 
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15. On May 11, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed a Notice of Judgment 
against UDOT. 
16. On May 12, 1994, UDOT filed an answer to Mr. Henshaw's 
Amended Complaint. 
17. On May 13, 1994, UDOT filed a Motion to Set Aside the 
Default Judgment. 
18. On June 24, 1994, Judge Frederick set aside the Default 
Judgment against UDOT and entered an order directing Mr. Henshaw 
to certify the matter for trial within thirty days. 
19. On June 29, 1994, Mr. Henshaw, pursuant to the 
stipulation with UDOT, filed a Second Amended Complaint. 
20. On June 30, 1994, the trial court filed a stipulation 
signed by Mr. Henshaw and UDOT setting aside the Default 
Judgment. 
21. On June 30, 1994, Judge Frederick signed the Order 
setting aside the Default Judgment and allowing Mr. Henshaw to 
file a Second Amended Complaint. 
22. On July 8, 1994, UDOT filed an answer to Mr. Henshaw1s 
Second Amended Complaint. 
23. On July 15, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed a Demand for Jury 
Trial and paid the required Jury Fee. 
24. On July 26, 1994, Mr. Henshaw served UDOT with his 
First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and 
Requests for Production of Documents and filed a Certificate of 
Discovery. 
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25. On July 28, 1994, Judge Frederick signed another order 
setting aside the Default Judgment against UDOT and stating that 
Mr. Henshaw had to certify the case for trial within thirty days 
of June 24, 1994. 
26. On August 3, 1994, UDOT filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment and a Motion for a Protective Order. 
27. On August 4, 1994, Judge Frederick granted UDOT's 
Motion for a Protective Order. 
28. On August 15, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed a Motion to 
Reconsider the trial court's Order of June 28, 1994. 
29. On August 16, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
30. On August 26, 1994, UDOT filed a Reply Memorandum in 
Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
31. On September 1, 1994, Judge Frederick denied Mr. 
Henshaw's Motion to Reconsider, Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Strike 
the Affidavit of Max Williams, and Mr. Henshaw's Objection to 
UDOT's Protective Order. 
32. On September 1, 1994, Judge Frederick also granted 
UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
33. On September 26, 1994, the trial court entered an order 
granting Summary Judgment in favor of UDOT and denying Mr. 
Henshaw's Motion to Reconsider the Order of June 28, 1994, Mr. 
Henshaw's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Max Williams and Mr. 
Henshaw's Objection to UDOT's Protective Order. 
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34. On October 25, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed his Notice of 
Appeal. 
(C) 
DISPOSITION OF CASE AT TRIAL COURT 
1. Judge Lewis granted Sweeney's Motion on June 4, 1992. 
2. However, on June 4, 1992, Judge Lewis took under 
advisement UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
3. On June 23, 1992, Judge Lewis ruled that UDOT's Motion 
for Summary Judgment was rendered moot by an order entered on 
June 22, 1992, dismissing with prejudice all counts of Mr. 
Henshaw's Complaint. 
4. On July 23, 1992, Judge Lewis set aside the June 22, 
1992 Order. 
5. On March 29, 1994, Judge Frederick denied UDOT's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
6. On August 3, 1994, UDOT filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment and a Motion for a Protective Order. 
7. On September 1, 1994, Judge Frederick granted UDOT's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
8. On September 26, 1994, the trial court entered an order 
granting Summary Judgment in favor of UDOT and denying Mr. 
Henshaw's Motion to Reconsider the Order of June 28, 1994, Mr. 
Henshaw's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Max Williams and Mr. 
Henshaw's Objection to UDOT's Protective Order. 
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(D) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Appellant, Mr. Henshaw, filed his Complaint on 
February 6, 1992. (Record at page 2). 
2. On March 9, 1992, Defendant UDOT filed a Motion and 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (Record at 
page 28, 31). 
3. On March 23, 1992, Mr. Henshaw filed an Amended 
Complaint. (Record at page 52). 
4. On March 23, 1992, a Request for Hearing was filed. 
(Record at page 87). 
5. On March 23, 1992, Mr. Henshaw filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Record at 
page 39). 
6. On March 30, 1992, Defendant Sweeney filed a Motion to 
Dismiss. (Record at page 74). 
7. On March 30, 1992, Defendant Sweeney filed a Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss. 
(Record at page 77). 
8. On March 31, 1992, Defendant UDOT filed a Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (Record at 
page 89). 
9. On April 10, 1992, Mr. Henshaw filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Ireene Sweeneys Motion to Dismiss. (Record at page 
98) . 
10. On April 20, 1992, Defendant Sweeney filed a Reply 
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Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss. (Record at page 121). 
11. On April 20, 1992, Sweeney filed a Request for Hearing. 
(Record at page 116). 
12. On April 23, 1992, Defendant Sweeney filed a Motion to 
Dismiss Amended Complaint. (Record at page 143). 
13. A hearing was scheduled for UDOT's Motion and Sweeney's 
Motion for June 4, 1992. (Record at page 151). 
14. On June 4, 1992, Judge Lewis granted Sweeney's Motion. 
(Record at page 153). 
15. However, on June 4, 1992, Judge Lewis took under 
advisement UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Record at page 
153) . 
16. On June 23, 1992, Judge Lewis ruled that UDOT's Motion 
for Summary Judgment was rendered moot by an order entered on 
June 22, 1992, dismissing with prejudice all counts of Mr. 
Henshaw's Complaint. (Record at page 159). 
17. On July 6, 1992, Mr. Henshaw filed a Motion and 
Memorandum in Support of his Motion to Set Aside Defendant's 
Order of Dismissal. (Record at page 161, 162). 
18. On July 13, 1992, Defendant UDOT filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal. (Record at 
page 170). 
19. On July 16, 1992, Mr. Henshaw filed a Reply Memorandum 
in Support of Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal. (Record at 
page 181). 
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20. On July 17, 1992, Mr. Henshaw filed a Notice of Appeal. 
(Record at page 186). 
21. On July 17, 1992, Mr. Henshaw file a Notice to Submit 
for Decision on Mr. Henshaw1s Motion to Set Aside Judgment. 
(Record at page 188). 
22. On July 20, 1992, UDOT filed a Notice to Submit on Mr. 
Henshaw1s Motion to Set Aside Order. (Record at page 191). 
23. On July 23, 1992, Judge Lewis set aside the June 22, 
1992 Order. (Record at page 193). 
24. On August 10, 1992, Mr. Henshaw filed an Objection to 
Proposed Order of Dismissal. (Record at page 196). 
25. On August 12, 1992, UDOT filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Objection to Proposed Order of Dismissal. (Record 
at page 201). 
26. On October 9, 1992, the Supreme Court dismissed and 
remanded the case. (Record at page 212). 
27. On October 23, 1992, Judge Lewis sent a letter 
requesting that the parties state whether they object to Judge 
Lewis remaining on the case pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision in Regional Agency, Inc., v. Reichart. Pursuant to that 
letter, counsel for Mr. Henshaw, requested that Judge Lewis 
recuse herself from this case and requested that another judge be 
assigned to the case. (Record at page 216). 
28. On March 31, 1993, Defendant Sweeney filed an Order of 
Dismissal with Prejudice. (Record at page 218). 
29. On March 4, 1994, Judge Lewis recused herself from this 
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case. (Record at page 240). 
30. Judge Lewis refused to rule on UDOT's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, taken under advisement on June 4, 1992, and on 
March 4, 1994, Judge Murphy assigned the case to Judge Frederick. 
(Record at page 243). 
31. On March 11, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed a Motion to 
Disqualify Judge Lewis. (Record at page 244). 
32. On March 25, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed a Notice to 
Submit. (Record at page 254). 
33. On March 29, 1994, Judge Frederick denied UDOT's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. (Record at page 256). 
34. On April 19, 1994, Judge Frederick signed an order 
directing UDOT to file an answer to Mr. Henshaw1s Amended 
Complaint within ten days. (Record at page 258). 
35. On May 5, 1994, the Court entered a Default against 
UDOT. (Record at page 262) . 
36. On May 6, 1994, Judge Frederick signed and entered a 
Default Judgment against UDOT. (Record at page 264). 
37. On May 6, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed an Ex Parte Motion 
for Entry of Default Judgment. (Record at page 263). 
38. On May 11, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed a Notice of 
Judgment. (Record at page 266). 
39. On May 12, 1994, UDOT filed an answer to Mr. Henshaw1s 
Amended Complaint. (Record at page 268). 
40. On May 13, 1994, UDOT filed a Motion and Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default and Default 
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Judgment. (Record at page 277, 279). 
41. On May 25, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. 
(Record at page 298). 
42. On June 20, 1994, a Notice to Submit was filed. 
(Record at page 302). 
43. On June 24, 1994, Judge Frederick set aside the Default 
Judgment against UDOT and entered an order directing Mr. Henshaw 
to certify the matter for trial within thirty days of June 24, 
1994. (Record at page 304). 
44. On June 29, 1994, Mr. Henshaw, pursuant to stipulation 
with UDOT, filed a Second Amended Complaint. (Record at page 
306) . 
45. On June 30, 1994, the trial court filed a stipulation 
signed by Mr. Henshaw and UDOT setting aside the Default Judgment 
and allowing Mr. Henshaw to file a Second Amended Complaint. 
(Record at page 330). 
46. On June 30, 1994, Judge Frederick signed the Order 
setting aside the Default Judgment and allowing Mr. Henshaw to 
file a Second Amended Complaint. (Record at page 3 32). 
47. On July 8, 1994, UDOT filed an Answer to Mr. Henshaw's 
Second Amended Complaint. (Record at page 336). 
48. On July 15, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed a Demand for Jury 
Trial and paid the required Jury Fee. (Record at page 353). 
49. On July 18, 1994, Mr. Henshaw served UDOT with his 
First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and 
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Requests for Production of Documents and filed a Certificate of 
Discovery. (Record at page 355) . 
50. On July 28, 1994, Judge Frederick signed another order 
setting aside the Default Judgment against UDOT and stating that 
Mr. Henshaw had to certify the case for trial within thirty days 
of June 24, 1994. (Record at page 357). 
51. On August 3, 1994, UDOT filed a Motion and Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (Record at page 360-
362) . 
52. On August 3, 1994, UDOT filed a Motion and Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for a Protective Order. (Record at page 
401-403). 
53. On August 3, 1994, UDOT filed a Request for Hearing. 
(Record at page 406). 
54. On August 4, 1994, Judge Frederick granted UDOT's 
Motion for a Protective Order. (Record at page 408). 
55. On August 15, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed a Motion and 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order 
of July 28, 1994. (Record at page 420, 422). 
56. On August 16, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Record at 
page 429). 
57. On August 19, 1994, UDOT filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion to Reconsider Minute Entry of June 24, 1994, 
and Order of July 28, 1994. (Record at page 498). 
58. On August 22, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed an Objection to 
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Proposed Order. (Record at page 507). 
59. On August 23, 1994, UDOT filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Mr. Henshaw's Objection to UDOT's Proposed Order. 
(Record at page 509). 
60. On August 26, 1994, UDOT filed a Reply Memorandum in 
Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. (Record at page 
513) . 
61. On August 30, 1994, a Notice to Submit was filed. 
(Record at page 567). 
62. On August 30, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed a Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider Order of July 28, 
1994. (Record at page 552). 
63. On September 1, 1994, Judge Frederick denied Mr. 
Henshaw's Motion to Reconsider, Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Strike 
the Affidavit of Max Williams, and Mr. Henshaw's Objection to 
UDOT's Protective Order. (Record at page 569). 
64. On September 1, 1994, Judge Frederick also granted 
UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Record at page 569). 
65. On September 26, 1994, the trial court entered an order 
granting Summary Judgment in favor of UDOT and denying Mr. 
Henshaw's Motion to Reconsider the Order of July 28, 1994, Mr. 
Henshaw's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Max Williams and Mr. 
Henshaw's Objection to UDOT's Protective Order. (Record at page 
590) . 
66. On October 25, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed his Notice of 
Appeal. (Record at page 594). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred both as a matter of fact and as a 
matter of law when it granted UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
There are genuine issues of material fact present in this case 
which precluded the trial Court from granting UDOT's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The trial court also erred in granting UDOT's 
Motion for Summary Judgment because UDOT was not entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law. 
The trial court erred both as a matter of fact and as a 
matter of law when it granted Sweeney's Motion to Dismiss. There 
are genuine issued of material fact present in this case which 
precluded the trial Court from granting Sweeney's Motion to 
Dismiss. The trial court also erred in granting Sweeney's Motion 
for to dismiss because Sweeney was not entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law. 
EX 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BOTH AS A MATTER OF FACT AND AS A MATTER 
OF LAW WHEN IT GRANTED UDOT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
THE TRIAL COURT ALSO ERRED AS A MATTER OF FACT AND AS A MATTER OF 
LAW WHEN IT GRANTED SWEENEY'S MOTION TO DISMISS. 
POINT I 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST IN THIS CASE WHICH 
PRECLUDED THE TRIAL COURT FROM ENTERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF UDOT. 
In the ins tant matter there are many genuine i s s u e s of 
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material fact which precluded the trial court from granting 
Summary Judgment in favor of UDOT. If there is a dispute as to a 
genuine issue of material fact, the appellate court must reverse 
the grant of summary judgment and remand for trial on that issue. 
Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat1! Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). 
It is immaterial that the evidence on one side may appear to be 
strong or even compelling. Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 
P.2d 750, 752 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Therefore, this Court must 
reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of UDOT and remand 
this matter to the trial court for a trial on the merits. 
UDOT claims in paragraph No. 17 of its Answer to Mr. 
Henshaw's Amended Complaint and also in paragraph No. 17 of its 
Answer to Mr. Henshawfs Amended Complaint, that UDOT was willing 
to accept final payment from Mr. Henshaw and was willing to 
provide Mr. Henshaw with a Warranty Deed and, in fact, actually 
prepared the warranty deed on October 13, 1987. (Record at page 
339). Those facts are specifically disputed by Mr. Henshaw and 
by the recordings and transcripts of Mr. Henshaw's conversations 
with Max Williams and Dean Holbrook See Exhibit No. 1 and 
Exhibits "G," "H", "J", and "K", to Mr. Henshaw's Memorandum in 
Opposition to UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Record at 
pages 467, 470, 481, 485). 
In its Motion for Summary Judgment UDOT falsely claimed that 
the Warranty Deed dated August 28, 1991, was prepared October 13, 
1987. Such an assertion is a deliberate misrepresentation of the 
facts. The form used for the August 28, 1991 deed may have been 
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prepared on October 13, 1987; however, the Deed was not filled in 
until August 28, 1991. A copy of a blank warranty deed 
containing the same notation , i.e., "Prepared by JRP 10/13/87" 
is attached to Mr. Henshawfs Memorandum in Opposition to UDOT's 
Motion for Summary Judgment as Exhibit No. 2. (Record at page 
494) . 
In paragraph No. 17 of its Answer, and in paragraph no. 17 
of its Amended Answer UDOT claims it offered to give Mr. Henshaw 
a Warranty Deed granting him fee simple title to the property. 
Yet, in paragraph No. 10 of its Answer, UDOT claims it only gave 
Sweeney "a right of way" to the property and not a fee title. 
(Record at page 269-270). Interestingly, UDOT failed to provide 
a copy of the deed to Sweeney with its Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Therefore, a genuine issue of fact exists as to what 
type of interest Sweeney had in the property, what type of 
interest Sweeney was selling to Mr. Henshaw, what type of 
interest UDOT actually had in the property, and what type of 
interest they were attempting to coerce Mr. Henshaw into 
accepting by means of the Quit Claim Deed they insisted he 
accept. 
There is also a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
UDOT would accept Mr. Henshaw1s tender of the final payment. 
UDOT claims it never refused to accept the tender. Mr. Henshawfs 
Affidavit and the transcripts of conversations with UDOT 
officials clearly indicate something differently. (Record at 
pages 454, 465, 467, 470, 481, 485). 
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UDOT further asserts that Mr. Henshaw never tendered final 
payment until August 28, 1991. However, Mr. Henshaw1s Affidavit, 
the transcripts of the conversations with UDOT representatives 
and the letter from Gorgon Madden, clearly refute UDOT's 
assertions. (Record at pages 465, 466). Thus, genuine issues of 
material fact exist which precluded the trial court from granting 
UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
UDOT also asserts that it did not know that Mr. Henshaw's 
property did not belong to UDOT until after Salt Lake County 
Flood Control had gone on the property and constructed a catch 
basin and other structures on Mr. Henshaw's property. Mr. 
Henshaw's testimony, however, is that at the meeting with UDOT 
and Flood Control officials, Williams declared that Mr. Henshaw 
did not own the property and that Flood Control could do any 
thing they wanted to do on the property. (Record at page 465-
466) . 
UDOT claims that they only learned of Mr. Brady's interest 
in the property in 1991. (Record at page 33 6). However, both 
Brady and his attorney informed Mr. Henshaw that Mr. Brady had 
been working with UDOT for years to resolve his interest in the 
property, and that UDOT specifically told Mr. Brady not to talk 
to Mr. Henshaw about the property. (Record at page 431-432). 
Thus, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to when UDOT 
first learned of Mr. Brady's interest in the property and the 
reason for their failure to inform Mr. Henshaw of Mr. Brady's 
claim. 
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There are many issues of material fact present in this 
matter which precluded the trial court from entering Summary 
Judgment in favor of UDOT. Therefore, the trial court committed 
prejudicial and reversible error when it granted UDOT's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Because the trial court committed 
prejudicial and reversible error when it granted UDOT's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, the judgment of the trial court must be 
reversed and this matter remanded to the trial court for a trial 
on Mr. Henshawfs claims. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN GRANTING UDOT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
UDOT was not legally entitled to summary judgment under any 
of its arguments to the trial court, even assuming, arguendo, 
that there were not genuine issues of fact present in this case 
which precluded the trial court from entering summary judgment in 
favor of UDOT. Because the trial court did not specify its 
reasoning for granting UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment under 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but rather made 
a general statement for the reasons specified in UDOT's Motion, 
Mr. Henshaw will address the legal error in granting summary 
judgment to UDOT on any of its legal theories. 
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, UDOT claimed that Mr. 
Henshaw's First, Second, Third and Fifth causes of action failed 
to state a claim against UDOT, and therefore, UDOT was entitled 
to Summary Judgment as a matter of law. In granting UDOT's 
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Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court committed 
prejudicial and reversible err in granting UDOT's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. UDOT also claimed Mr. Henshaw1s Fifth Cause of 
Action is barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, and that 
Mr. Henshaw1s First, Second, Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action 
are time barred. 
A. MR. HENSHAWS FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION STATES A CLAIM AGAINST 
UDOT. 
In its Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment, UDOT falsely asserts that Mr. Henshawfs First Cause of 
Action is based on the implied covenant of a Warranty Deed that 
the grantor has good title and the right to convey. (Record at 
page 367). Mr. Henshaw's First Cause of Action entitled Breach 
of Contract, Covenant to Convey Title is not based on the implied 
covenant contained in a Warranty Deed; it is based on the express 
covenant contained in paragraph No. 19 of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract between Sweeney and Mr. Henshaw. Paragraph No. 19 of the 
Contract specifically states: 
The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be 
paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned agrees to 
execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and 
sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the above 
described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except 
as herein mentioned. . . . (Emphasis added). (Record at 
page 457-458). 
UDOT breached the covenant specified in paragraph 19 of the 
Contract. See Exhibit No. 1 and Exhibits "G", "H", HJ,f, and "K 
to Mr. Henshawfs Memorandum in Opposition to UDOT's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (Record at pages 467, 470, 481, 485 ). UDOT 
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has admitted that it is bound by the terms covenants and 
conditions of the Contract. See UDOT's Memorandum, page 11, f 1. 
(Record at page 371-372). Consequently, UDOT is estopped to 
claim that it did not covenant to convey a Warranty Deed to Mr. 
Henshaw. The breach of that covenant is set forth in Mr. 
Henshaw's First Cause of Action. Therefore, UDOT's assertion 
that Mr. Henshaw's First Cause of Action fails to state a claim 
for relief is totally without basis in fact or law and the trial 
court committed prejudicial and reversible error when it granted 
UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
B. MR. HENSHAW'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION STATES A CLAIM AGAINST 
UDOT. 
UDOT's also falsely asserted in its Motion for Summary 
Judgment that Mr. Henshaw's Second Cause of Action for "Breach of 
Quiet Enjoyment" was based on a Warranty Deed. (Record at page 
3 67). Mr. Henshaw's claim of breach of quiet enjoyment is based 
on the Contract between Sweeny and Mr. Henshaw not on a Warranty 
Deed. Although the Contract states that it is a "Uniform Real 
Estate Contract," the Contract is in fact a land sales contract. 
Pursuant to the Contract Mr. Henshaw was given possession of the 
property. 
A party in possession of property under a land sales 
contract has the right to quiet possession and enjoyment of the 
property if the party is performing on the Contract. A person 
having possession of the land is entitled to the beneficial use, 
occupation and enjoyment of the land. 92 C.J.S. Vendor & 
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Purchaser, § 284, § 285. Vendee under a real estate contract has 
the right to possession of the land, the right of dominion and 
control of the land and the vendee may sue for trespass and to 
enjoin construction offense. Bays v. Haven, 777 P.d 562 Wash. 
Alp. 324 (1989) ; Real Estate contracts are transfers of 
equitable interest in property. The purchaser has the right to 
possession, the right to control the land, the right to sue for 
trespass, the right to sue to quiet title and quiet possession. 
Chelan County V. Wilson, 744 P.2d 1106, 49 Wash Alp. 628 (1987). 
Mr. Henshaw's cause of action for Quiet Possession of the 
property is based on the Contract between Mr. Henshaw and 
Sweeney, not a Warranty Deed. Under the Contract Mr. Henshaw is 
entitled to quiet possession of the property. UDOT has admitted 
that all of the provisions of the Contract are obligatory on 
UDOT. (UDOT's Memorandum, page 11, f 2). (Record at page 372-
371). Therefore, Mr. Henshaw's Second Cause of Action properly 
states a claim. UDOT's assertion that Mr. Henshaw's Second 
Cause of Action fails to state a claim for relief is totally 
without basis in fact or law and the trial court committed 
prejudicial and reversible error when it granted UDOT's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
C. MR. HENSHAWS FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY THE 
UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
Again, contrary to UDOT's assertion, Mr. Henshaw's Fifth 
Cause of Action entitled, Conspiracy to Defraud, is not barred by 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. It is true that UDOT as a 
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State entity is immune from suit for any exercise of a 
governmental function. However, UDOT's purchase of Sweeney's 
contract with Mr. Henshaw is not a state function. 
While there are situations in which UDOT's buying and 
selling real estate may be a state function. UDOT's buying of 
Sweeney's contract with Mr. Henshaw is not such a situation. 
Buying and selling real estate contracts is not of its self a 
governmental function, and it is certainly not a function of 
UDOT. 
UDOT's assertion that its condemnation of certain of 
Sweeney's property was a governmental function, is probably 
correct. (Record at page 369). However, UDOT's purchase of the 
Contract between Mr. Henshaw and Sweeney is clearly not a 
governmental function, when that purchase was not in association 
with any legitimate state function of UDOT. 
UDOT is not in the real estate business. UDOT did not buy 
the Contract between Sweeney and Mr. Henshaw as part of any state 
project, state contract or state purpose. It is disingenuous for 
UDOT to claim that its purchase of the Contract between Mr. 
Henshaw and Sweeney is a governmental function for which UDOT has 
immunity. 
UDOT was under no legal obligation to buy the Contract from 
Sweeney. UDOT had given Sweeney a Quit Claim Deed for the 
property, which Sweeney accepted. Therefore, Sweeney got the 
benefit of her bargain, and she took the property subject to all 
liens, encumbrances and defects in title. Sweeney only received 
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as good of a title as UDOT had when it conveyed the property to 
Sweeney, and that was a title subject to the claims by Proctor 
and Brady. UDOT cannot now claim that its purchase of the 
contract between Mr. Henshaw and Sweeney was a "governmental 
function." Such an assertion is spurious at best. 
Because Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amended, § 63-30-3 
specifies that "all governmental entities are immune from suit 
for any injury which results from the exercise of a governmental 
function", UDOT is not immune from suit due to its conspiracy to 
defraud Mr. Henshaw in connection with UDOT's purchase of the 
Contract from Sweeney. Therefore, UDOT's assertion that Mr. 
Henshaw1s Fifth Cause of Action fails to state a claim for 
relief, is totally without basis in fact or law and the trial 
court committed prejudicial and reversible error when it granted 
UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
D. MR. HENSHAW'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT TIME BARRED. 
In what is truly a novel approach to contract law, UDOT 
asserts that it succeeded to Sweeney's breach with Mr. Henshaw 
and, therefore, Mr. Henshaw's claim is barred by the statute of 
limitations that began to run against UDOT at Sweeney's breach. 
(UDOT's Memorandum, page 11, H 2). (Record at page 372). In 
support of this ridiculous argument, UDOT cites to several cases 
that have no relevance whatsoever to UDOT's assertion that UDOT 
did or could accede to Sweeney's Breach. 
UDOT, however, did not, and cannot, cite to any case, 
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statute or other authority supporting its assertion that a person 
who buys a contract that has been breached by the person selling 
the contract also buys the breach of the seller. Such an 
assertion is so ridiculous that it is mind boggling. One cannot 
breach a contract until he has an obligation to preform under 
that contract. 
UDOT had no obligation to convey Mr. Henshaw a Warranty Deed 
to the property, and to provide Mr. Henshaw with title insurance 
on the property until Mr. Henshaw tendered UDOT final payment on 
the property. Final payment was not tendered until March 1986. 
Therefore, UDOT's breach occurred, at the earliest, in March of 
1986, when UDOT first refused to accept Mr. Henshaw's payment and 
provide Mr. Henshaw with a Warranty Deed and title insurance as 
required by the Contract UDOT purchased from Sweeney. 
It is undisputed that Mr. Henshaw did not tender final 
payment to UDOT until March 1986, at the earliest. UDOT did not, 
and could not, breach the Contract with Mr. Henshaw until Mr. 
Henshaw tendered the final payment to UDOT. When Mr. Henshaw 
tendered final payment to UDOT and it refused to accept the 
payment and refused to convey the property to Mr. Henshaw by a 
Warranty Deed and provide Mr. Henshaw with title insurance, as 
required by the Contract, UDOT breached the Contract with Mr. 
Henshaw. 
UDOT's breach of its covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
also occurred at the earliest in March 1986, when Mr. Henshaw 
tendered final payment to UDOT, and UDOT refused to accept the 
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payment and refused to convey Mr. Henshaw a Warranty Deed and 
provide Mr. Henshaw with title insurance, as required by the 
Contract. 
Mr. Henshawfs First Cause of Action and his Fourth Cause of 
Action are based on a written agreement, i.e., the Contract. The 
breach of contract and the breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing are governed by a six-year statute of 
limitations that began to run no earlier than March 1986. Mr. 
Henshaw filed his Complaint against UDOT on February 6, 1992, 
clearly within the six-year statute of limitations. Therefore, 
Mr. Henshaw's Complaint is not time barred. Consequently, UDOT's 
assertion that Mr. Henshaw's First and Fourth Cause of Action are 
bared by the statute of limitations is totally without basis in 
fact or law, and the trial court committed prejudicial and 
reversible error when it granted UDOT's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
E. MR. HENSHAWS SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT TIME BARRED. 
As previously set forth in this Brief, Mr. Henshaw's Second 
Cause of Action is based on the Contract between Sweeney and Mr. 
Henshaw. UDOT's breach of the Contract, with respect to Mr. 
Henshaw's possession and quiet enjoyment of the property, did not 
occur until 1988. Mr. Henshaw filed his Complaint in February 
1992, less than four years after the breach. Therefore, Mr. 
Henshaw's Second Cause of Action is not time barred by the 
six-year statute of limitations as UDOT asserted in its Motion 
30 
for Summary Judgment. Consequently, UDOT's assertion that Mr. 
Henshaw1s Second Cause of Action is barred by the statute of 
limitations is totally without basis in fact or law, and the 
trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error when it 
granted UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
F. MR. HENSHAWS CAUSE OF ACTION FOR "CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD" IS 
NOT TIME BARRED. 
Mr. Henshaw1s Cause of "Conspiracy to Defraud" is not time 
barred. Mr. Henshaw only learned upon receipt of UDOT's Answer 
to its Amended Complaint, received in May 1994, that UDOT was 
asserting that it never "transferred fee title" to Sweeney but 
rather that UDOT "deeded only a right of way to Sweeney." 
(UDOT's Answer to Mr. Henshaw's Amended Complaint, pages 2-3, 11 
10; UDOT's Answer to Mr. Henshaw's Second Amended Complaint, page 
7, H 37). (Record at page 269-270, 342). Mr. Henshaw only 
learned of Brady's interest in the property in 1991. 
UDOT clearly knew at the time it was insisting that Mr. 
Henshaw take a Quit Claim Deed and sign a release, absolving UDOT 
from all liability in connection with the property, that UDOT had 
only given Sweeny a "right of way" rather than fee title to the 
property. Nonetheless, UDOT conspired to defraud Mr. Henshaw 
into taking a Quit Claim Deed rather than the Warranty Deed 
required by the Contract. UDOT knowingly, intentionally, 
willfully and maliciously attempted to defraud Mr. Henshaw by 
insisting that Mr. Henshaw take a Quit Claim Deed and into 
signing a release, which would absolve UDOT of any liability on 
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the Contract. Those actions of UDOT constitute conspiracy to 
defraud. Mr. Henshaw only learned of UDOT's fraud from its 
answers filed in this matter in May and July 1994. Therefore, 
Mr. Henshawfs cause of action for Conspiracy to Defraud is not 
time barred by any statute of limitations. Consequently, UDOT's 
assertion that Mr. Henshaw's Fifth Cause of Action is bared by 
the statute of limitations is totally without basis in fact or 
law, and the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible 
error when it granted UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE ARE NO 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRESENT IN THIS CASE WHICH 
PRECLUDED THE TRIAL COURT FROM ENTERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF SWEENEY. 
Although Sweeney f i l e d a Motion t o Dismiss , the t r i a l court 
considered material outs ide the pleadings in rendering i t s 
d e c i s i o n , there fore , pursuant t o the prov i s ions of Rule 12 of the 
Utah Rules of C i v i l Procedure, Sweeney's Motion was converted to 
a Motion for Summary Judgment. Furthermore, a motion t o d ismiss 
i s reviewed under the same standard used t o review a motion for 
summary judgment. See Mountain American Credit Union v . 
McClellan, 854 P.2d 590, 591 (Utah App. 1993) . 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT MR. HENSHAWS 
CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT AROSE IN JULY 1985. 
The t r i a l court erred in concluding that Mr. Henshaw's cause 
of ac t ion for breach of contract aga inst Sweeney arose in July 
32 
1985. The contract between Mr. Henshaw and the Defendant was to 
run from June 1976 until the purchase price of $35,00.00, at 9% 
interest, was paid in full, at the rate of $350.00 per month. 
See Mr. Henshaw's Memorandum in Opposition to Sweeny's Motion to 
Dismiss. (Record at page 111-112). 
In July 1985, at Sweeney's request, Mr. Henshaw agreed to 
accelerate the contract and pay Sweeney the remainder due under 
the terms of the contract. See Mr. Henshaw's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Sweeny's Motion to Dismiss. (Record at page 114). 
However, Mr. Henshaw and Sweeney never actually agreed on a final 
payoff figure for the property. See Mr. Henshaw's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Sweeny's Motion to Dismiss. (Record at page 114-
115). Thought Mr. Henshaw wanted Sweeney to discount the payment 
in return for the early payoff, the final payment on the contract 
was not yet due. See Mr. Henshaw's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Sweeny's Motion to Dismiss. (Record at page 114). 
Although, from July 1985 through March 1986, Sweeney did not 
accept a final payoff from Mr. Henshaw, Sweeney never actually 
said that she would not accept a final payoff amount from Mr. 
Henshaw. Sweeney only told Mr. Henshaw that she could not accept 
any payments at those points in time, because she was working 
with UDOT to resolve some problems on the property; however, 
Sweeney did not tell Mr. Henshaw what those problems were. See 
Mr. Henshaw's Memorandum in Opposition to Sweeny's Motion to 
Dismiss. (Record at page 115). 
Because Sweeney did not actually refuse to accept Mr. 
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Henshaw's final payment and because final payment on the contract 
was not yet due, Sweeney1s Breach did not occur until Sweeney 
manifested her intention not to abide by the terms of the 
contract. The intention was not manifested until UDOT informed 
Mr. Henshaw that Sweeney had assigned the contract to UDOT. 
Therefore, the trial court erred in concluding that Sweeny's 
breach occurred in July 1985. The trial court's error was 
prejudicial and reversible. Consequently, the trial court's 
order dismissing Mr. Henshaw's Complaint must be reversed and 
this matter remanded to the trial court for a trial on the 
merits. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT MR. HENSHAWS 
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SWEENEY FOR FRAUDULENT 
INDUCEMENT ACCRUED NO LATER THAN JULY 1985. 
The undisputed facts of this matter are that Mr. Henshaw did 
not learn that Sweeney was unable to convey clear title to the 
property, because Richard Brady had title to the property, until 
the Spring of 1991. See Mr. Henshaw's Memorandum in Opposition 
to Sweeny's Motion to Dismiss. (Record at page 115). Therefore, 
Mr. Henshaw did not discover Sweeney's fraud until the Spring of 
1991. 
Mr. Henshaw's cause of action for Fraudulent Inducement 
could not occur until he knew of Sweeney's fraud. Therefore, the 
trial court erred in concluding that Mr. Henshaw's cause of 
action for Fraudulent Inducement occurred in July 1985. The 
trial court's error was prejudicial and reversible. 
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Consequently, the trial court's order dismissing Mr. Henshaw's 
Complaint must be reversed and this matter remanded to the trial 
court for a trial on the merits. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT 
SWEENY WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court was correct in 
concluding that Mr. Henshaw1s causes of action for Breach of 
Contract and Fraudulent Inducement occurred in July 1985, the 
trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that Sweeney 
was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
Sweeney's Motion was based on Sweeney's argument that Mr. 
Henshaw's causes of action against her were barred by the 
appropriate statute of limitations. However, under clear and 
controlling Utah law, Sweeney is precluded from relying on the 
statute of limitations as a defense to Mr. Henshaw's Complaint, 
even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court was correct in 
concluding that Mr. Henshaw's causes of action occurred in July 
1985. 
In Vencent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 105, 107 (Utah 
1981), the Utah Supreme Court held a plaintiff's cause of action 
was not barred by Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-13 until the 
plaintiff actually discovered the damage to his property. By 
parity of reasoning, Mr. Henshaw's causes of action did not arise 
until Mr. Henshaw learned of Sweeny's breach of her contract with 
Mr. Sweeney, i.e., when Mr. Henshaw learned of the conveyance of 
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the property from Sweeney to UDOT and learned of Sweeney's 
assignment of her interest in the contract to UDOT, i.e., in 
March of 1986. 
Although Sweeney deeded the property to UDOT, and also 
assigned her interest in the contract to UDOT in November 1985, 
Sweeney deliberately concealed those facts from Mr. Henshaw. 
Because Sweeney deliberately concealed the fact that she had 
conveyed the property to UDOT and the fact that she had assigned 
her interest in the property to UDOT from Mr. Henshaw, she is now 
estopped to claim the statute of limitations as a defense to Mr. 
Henshaw's causes of action against her. 
In Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311, 314 (Utah App. 1987), 
the Utah Court of Appeals stated: 
For example, in some circumstances, where the statute 
of limitations would normally bar a claim, proof of 
concealment or misleading by the defendant precludes 
the defendant from raising the statute of limitations 
defense. 
See also, Meyers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981) 
declaring: 
In other circumstances, where the statute of 
limitations would normally apply, this Court has held 
that proof of concealment or misleading by the 
defendant precludes the defendant from relying on the 
statute of limitations. 
Furthermore, in Rice v. Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 
456 P.2d 159, 163 (1969), the Utah Supreme Court held: 
One cannot justly or equitably lull an adversary into a 
false sense of security thereby subjecting his claim to 
the bar of limitations, and then be heard to plead that 
very delay as a defense to the action when brought. 
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In the instant action, Sweeney continually represented to 
Mr. Henshaw that she would consummate the sale of the property to 
Mr. Henshaw when she solved the problems with UDOT. See Mr. 
Henshaw's Memorandum in Opposition to Sweeny's Motion to Dismiss. 
(Record at page 114-115). Mr. Henshaw justifiably relied upon 
Sweeney's representations and continued to contact her to 
negotiate a final payment price for the property, until he was 
notified by UDOT that Sweeney had conveyed the property to UDOT 
and had assigned her interest in the contract to UDOT. 
Sweeney, however, transferred the title to the property to 
UDOT and assigned her interest in the contract to UDOT and 
deliberately concealed her actions from Mr. Henshaw. Therefore, 
even assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Henshaw's causes of action 
against Sweeny occurred in July 1985, as asserted by Sweeney in 
her Memorandum in Support of her Motion to Dismiss, Sweeney is 
estopped, by her concealment of her transfer of the property and 
her assignment of her interest in the contract to UDOT, from 
asserting the statute of limitations as a defense in this action 
to Mr. Henshaw's causes of action. Therefore, Mr. Henshaw's 
causes of actions against Sweeny are not time barred by any 
statute of limitations. Because Mr. Henshaw's causes of 
action against Sweeny are not barred by any statute of 
limitations, the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible 
error when it granted Sweeny's Motion to Dismiss. Therefore, the 
trial court's dismissal of Mr. Henshaw's causes of action against 
Sweeney for Breach of Contract and Fraudulent Inducement must be 
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reversed and this matter remanded to the trial court for a trial 
on the merits. 
Mr. Henshaw has chosen not to proceed with his claim of 
Intentional Infliction of emotional Distress against Sweeny. 
X 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The trial court committed reversible and prejudicial error 
when it granted UDOT'S Motion for Summary Judgment and when it 
granted Sweeney's Motion to Dismiss. Therefore, the trial 
court's grant of Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss must be 
reversed and the case remanded for trial. 
WHEREFORE, Mr. Henshaw respectfully request that the 
Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss entered by the trial court 
be reversed and this matter be remanded to the trial court for a 
trial on the merits. 
Dated this J_ day of March 1995. 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for Dee Henshaw 
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I hereby certify that on the / ^ day of March 1995, I 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief to the 
persons at the addresses listed below by depositing a copy in the 
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Ralph L. Finlayson 
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John A. Anderson 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as Amended, § 63-30-3 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, § 78-2-2 (3)(j) 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, § 78-2-2(4) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12 
92 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser, § 284, § 285 
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665 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 63-30-4 
Section 
63-30-37. 
63-30-38. 
Recovery of judgment paid and de-
fense costs by government em-
ployee. 
Indemnification of governmental en-
tity by employee not required. 
63-30-1. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the 
"Utah Governmental Immunity Act." 1965 
83-30-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action 
for money or damages against a governmental 
entity or against an employee. 
(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental 
entity's officers, employees, servants, trust-
ees, commissioners, members of a governing 
body, members of a board, members of a com-
mission, or members of an advisory body, of-
ficers and employees in accordance with Sec-
tion 62A-4-603, student teachers certificated 
in accordance with Section 53A-6-101, edu-
cational aides, students engaged in provid-
ing services to members of the public in the 
course of an approved medical, nursing, or 
other professional health care clinical train-
ing program, volunteers, and tutors, but does 
not include an independent contractor. 
(b) "Employee" includes all of the posi-
tions identified in Subsection (2)(a), whether 
or not the individual holding that position 
receives compensation. 
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state 
and its political subdivisions as defined in this 
chapter. 
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any 
act, failure to act, operation, function, or un-
dertaking of a governmental entity whether 
or not the act, failure to act, operation, func-
tion, or undertaking is characterized as gov-
ernmental, proprietary, a core governmental 
function, unique to government, undertaken 
in a dual capacity, essential to or not essen-
tial to a government or governmental func-
tion, or could be performed by private enter-
prise or private persons. 
(b) A "governmental function" may be 
performed by any department, agency, em-
ployee, agent, or officer of a governmental 
entity. 
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, 
damage to or loss of property, or any other injury 
that a person may suffer to his person, or estate, 
that would be actionable if inflicted by a private 
person or his agent. 
(6)^"Personal injury" means an injury of any 
kind other than property damage. 
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, 
city, town, school district, pubhc transit district, 
redevelopment agency, special improvement or 
taxing district, or other governmental subdivi-
sion or public corporation. 
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss 
of, any right, title, estate, or interest in real or 
personal property. 
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and in-
cludes any office, department, agency, authority, 
commission, board, institution, hospital, college, 
university, or other instrumentality of the state. 
1991 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities 
from suit. 
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
chapter, all governmental entities are immune from 
suit for any injury which results from the exercise of 
a governmental function, governmentally-owned hos-
pital, nursing home, or other governmental health 
care facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, 
or other professional health care clinical training pro-
gram conducted in either public or private facilities. 
(2) (a) For the purposes of this chapter only, the 
following state medical programs and services 
performed at a state-owned university hospital 
are unique or essential to the core of governmen-
tal activity in this state and are considered to be 
governmental functions: 
(i) care of a patient referred by another 
hospital or physician because of the high risk 
nature of the patient's medical condition; 
(ii) high risk care or procedures available 
in Utah only at a state-owned university 
hospital or provided in Utah only by physi-
cians employed at a state-owned university 
acting in the scope of their employment; 
(iii) care of patients who cannot receive 
appropriate medical care or treatment at an-
other medical facility in Utah; and 
(iv) any other service or procedure per-
formed at a state-owned university hospital 
or by physicians employed at a state-owned 
university acting in the scope of their em-
ployment that a court finds is unique or es-
sential to the core of governmental activity 
in this state. 
(b) If any claim under this subsection exceeds 
the limits established in Section 63-30-34, the 
claimant may submit the excess claim to the 
Board of Examiners and the Legislature under 
Title 63, Chapter 6. 
(3) The management of flood waters and other nat-
ural disasters and the construction, repair, and opera-
tion of flood and storm systems by governmental enti-
ties are considered to be governmental functions, and 
governmental entities and their officers and em-
ployees are immune from suit for any injury or dam-
age resulting from those activities. 
(4) Officers and employees of a Children's Justice 
Center are immune from suit for any injury which 
results from their joint intergovernmental functions 
at a center created in Title 62A, Chapter 4. 1991 
63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admis-
sion or denial of liability — Effect of 
waiver of immunity — Exclusive rem-
edy — Joinder of employee — Limita-
tions on personal liability. 
(1) (a) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless 
specifically provided, may be construed as an ad-
mission or denial of liability or responsibility by 
or for governmental entities or their employees. 
(b) If immunity from suit is waived by this 
chapter, consent to be sued is granted, and liabil-
ity of the entity shall be determined as if the 
entity were a private person. 
«(c) No cause of action or basis of liability is 
created by any waiver of immunity in this chap-
ter, nor may any provision of this chapter be con-
strued as imposing strict liability or absolute lia-
bility. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter may be construed as 
adversely affecting any immunity from suit that a 
IB JUDICIAL CODE 
78-za-z 
(6) There is created the office of associate chief jus-
fa The term of office of the associate chief justice is 
& years The associate chief justice may serve in 
L
 «l office no more than two successive terms The 
Kiate chief justice shall be elected by a majority 
_.j of the members of the Supreme Court and shall 
Mllocated duties as the chief justice determines If 
p* chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to 
Krve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief 
Mice The chief justice may delegate responsibilities 
Hlthe associate chief justice as consistent with law 
SM-1.5,78-2-1.6. Repealed. 
1990 
1971, 1981 
%1*2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
w (i) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to 
Uttwer questions of state law certified by a court of 
the United States 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to 
foue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue 
IJI writs and process necessary to carry into effect its 
irders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdic-
tion 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, 
deluding jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals, 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the 
Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the 
Court of Appeals, 
(c) discipline of lawyers, 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Com-
mission, 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudica-
tive proceedings originating with 
d) the Public Service Commission, 
(n) the State Tax Commission, 
(in) the Board of State Lands and For-
estry, 
dv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, or 
(v) the state engineer, 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court 
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of 
agencies under Subsection (e), 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of 
record holding a statute of the United States or 
this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah 
Constitution, 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record involving a charge of a first degree or capi-
tal felony, 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a 
conviction of a first degree or capital felony, and 
0) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court 
of record over which the Court of Appeals does 
not have original appellate jurisdiction 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court 
of Appeals any of the matters over which the Su-
preme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, ex-
cept 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of 
an interlocutory order of a court of record involv-
ing a charge of a capital felony, 
(b) election and voting contests, 
(c) reapportionment of election districts, 
(d) retention or removal of public officers, and 
(e) those matters desertbe«' in Subsections 
(3)(a) through (d) 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion m 
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari 
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but 
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified 
to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b) 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the re-
quirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its reviewjrf 
agency adjudicative proceedings tnM 
78-2-3. Repealed. 
1992 
19M 
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges 
pro tempore, and practice of law. 
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of proce-
dure and evidence for use in the courts of the state 
and shall by rule manage the appellate process The 
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and 
evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote 
of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Con-
stitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize 
retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to 
perform any judicial duties Judges pro tempore shall 
be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and 
admitted to practice law in Utah 
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the 
practice of law, including admission to practice law 
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to 
the practice of law 1986 
78-2-5. Repealed. 1988 
78-2-6. Appellate court administrator. 
The appellate court administrator shall appoint 
clerks and support staff as necessary for the operation 
of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals The 
duties of the clerks and support staff shall be estab-
lished by the appellate court administrator, and 
powers established by rule of the Supreme Court 
1986 
78-2-7. Repealed. 1980 
78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court. 
The court may at any time require the attendance 
and services of any .sheriff in the state 1988 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed. 1986, 1988 
Section 
78-2a-l 
78-2a-2 
78-2a-3 
78-2a-4 
78-2a-5 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Creation — Seal 
Number of judges — Terms — Functions 
— Filing fees 
Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
Location of Court of Appeals 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
There is created a court known as the Court of Ap-
peals The Court of Appeals is a court of record and 
shall have a seal \gm 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Func-
tions — Filing fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges 
The term of appointment to office as a judge of the 
Court of Appeals is until the first general election 
held more than three years after the effective date of 
the appointment Thereafter, the term of office of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and com-
mences on the first Monday in January, next follow-
ing the date of election A judge whose term expires 
may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until 
Rule 12 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 34 
tion of this rule is a question of law. Taylor v. 
Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989); Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991,). 
—Sanctions. 
This rule gives trial courts great leeway to 
tailor the sanction to fit the requirements of 
the particular case. Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 
770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Attaching the wrong document to a com-
plaint violated this rule because a reasonable 
inquiry would have revealed the mistake; 
award of attorney fees was appropriate because 
the error caused defendants to incur legal ex-
pense in researching the validity of an irrele-
vant document and preparing a motion to dis-
miss based on it. Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 
770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Award of costs and attorney fees was an ap-
propriate sanction for attempting to go forward 
with a class action that, in light of the com-
plete resolution of the matter eleven months 
prior, was "unconscionable and beyond rea-
son." Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 
P.2d 59 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
—Standard. 
Sanctions were improper against an attor-
ney, where opposing parties conceded that no 
particular document was signed in violation of 
the rule, but simply argued that even if the 
attorney believed the case was well grounded 
when he filed the complaint, he should have 
known after he met with counsel for defen-
dants that the case could not go forward. 
Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
Utah appellate courts shpuld use the three-
standard approach in reviewing a trial court's 
Rule 11 findings. This approach includes: (1) 
reviewing the trial court's findings of fact un-
der the clearly erroneous standard; (2) review-
ing the trial court's ultimate conclusion that 
Rule 11 was violated and any subsidiary legal 
conclusions under the correction of error stan-
dard; and (3) reviewing the trial court's deter-
mination as to the type and amount of sanction 
to be imposed under the abuse of discretion 
standard. Barnard v. >Suthff, 846 P.2d 1229 
(Utah 1992). 
Cited in Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 
1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Rimensburger v. 
Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Legislative Enactments — At-
torney's Fees, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 342. 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Curbing 
Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough Is 
Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 579. 
Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: 
We're Not There Yet, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 597, 
Note, Appellate Review of Rule 11 Issues — 
De Novo or Abuse of Discretion? Thomas v. 
Capital Security Services, Inc., 1989 B.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 877. 
Rule 11 and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics, 
1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 959. 
Fines Under New Federal Civil Rule 11: The 
New Monetary Sanctions for the "Stop-and-
Think-Again" Rule, 1993 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 879. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading 
§§ 339 to 349. 
C.J.S. — 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 339 to 366. 
A.L.R. — Liability of attorney, acting for cli-
ent, for malicious prosecution, 46 A.L.R.4th 
249. 
Inherent power of federal district court to 
impose monetary sanctions on counsel in ab-
sence of contempt of court, 77 A.L.R. Fed. 789. 
Comment Note — General principles regard-
ing imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 A.L.R. Fed. 
107. 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in ac-
tions for defamation, 95 A.L.R. Fed. 181. 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in action 
for wrongful discharge from employment, 96 
A.L.R. Fed. 13. 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in ac-
tions for securities fraud, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 107. 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in ac-
tions for infliction of emotional distress, 98 
A.L.R. Fed. 442. 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
signing and verification of pleadings, in anti-
trust actions, 99 A.L.R. Fed. 573. 
Procedural requirements for imposition of 
sanctions under Rule M, Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 100 A.L.R. Fed. 556. 
Key Numbers. — Pleading «=» 287 to 304. 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty 
days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete unless other-
wise expressly provided by statute or order of the court. A party served with a 
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto 
within twenty days after the service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his 
reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the 
answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service 
of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under 
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this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed 
by order of the court: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the 
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten 
days after notice of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the 
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of 
the more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following* defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by 
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction 
over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insuffi-
ciency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of 
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permit-
ted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other 
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further plead-
ing after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim 
for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive 
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for 
relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure 
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters 
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed 
but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judg-
ment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters 
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in 
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the 
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard 
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court 
orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a respon-
sive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot 
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a 
more definite statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The mo-
tion shaii p^int out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the 
motion is granted and the order of the court as not obeyed within ten days 
after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the 
court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such 
order as it deems just. 
(f) Motion* to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a 
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion 
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading upon 
him, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense 
or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this 
rule may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available 
to him. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein 
all defenses and objections then available to him which this rule permits to be 
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raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the 
defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this 
rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objection* \vhieh 
he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has 
made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join 
an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a 
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion 
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, 
whenever it appears by suggestion Of the parties or otherwise that the court 
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The 
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in 
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
d) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading 
after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be 
deemed a waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an 
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may 
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges 
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determina-
tion by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the 
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for 
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. 
No security shall be required of any bffi$er, instrumentality, or agency of the 
United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the 
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court 
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment inserted "and complaint" in the first sen-
tence. 
ANALYSIS 
Jurisdiction over the person. 
Motion for judgment on pleadings. 
—Matters outside of pleadings. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Rights of opposing party. 
Motion for more definite statement. 
—Bill of particulars. 
—Criteria 
—Motion to dismiss distinguished. 
—Purpose. 
Delay. 
Obtaining evidence. 
Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
—Explained. 
—Improper. 
—Standard. 
—Standard of review. 
Motion to dismiss for lack of venue. 
—Forum-selection clause in contract. 
Presentation of defenses. 
—How presented 
Affirmative defenses. 
Divorce 
Election of remedies. 
Failure to state claim upon which relief 
can be granted. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially similar to Rule 12, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Motions generally, 
U R.C.P. 7 
General and special appearances. 
Statute of frauds. 
Venue. 
—When presented. 
Amended answer. 
Security for costs of nonresident plaintiff. 
—Failure to file. 
Summary judgment. 
—Conversion of motion to dismiss. 
—Court's discretion. 
—Court's initiative. 
—Defenses. 
—Opportunity to present pertinent material. 
—Preclusion. 
Issues of fact. 
Waiver of defenses. 
—Defect of parties. 
—Defective service of process. 
—Exceptions. 
Subject matter jurisdiction. 
When issues raised. 
—Failure to join indispensable party. 
—Failure to pay consideration. 
—Mutual mistake. 
—Statute of frauds. 
—Statute of limitations. 
—Waiver. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
92 C.J.S. VENDOR & PURCHASER §§ 284-286 
rescind and surrender possession, or, if he retains 
possession, pay the purchase price.15 
§ 285. Use, Occupation, and Enjoyment 
Tue person having the right to possession is entitled 
to the beneficial use, occupation, and enjoyment of the 
property. 
Where the purchaser is entitled to the posaession, 
as considered supra § 284, he is entitled to the ben-
eficial use, occupation, and enjoyment of the prop-
e r t y i 6 On the other hand, where the right to 
possession is in the vendor, as discussed supra § 284, 
he h^ the exclusive right of beneficial enjoyment 
for the time being.17 A purchaser who, at the time 
specified in the contract for delivery of possession, 
gave the vendor permission to occupy the premises 
together with purchaser for a reasonable time, may 
not within such reasonable time revoke such permis-
sion without reason.18 
§ 286. Waste 
a. By vendor 
b. By purchaser 
a. By Vendor 
Except as far a» his rights may be enlarged by the 
terms of the contract, a vendor remaining In posses-
sion is liable for waste committed by him after the 
execution of the contract of sale. 
Except as far as his rights may be enlarged by tht 
terms of the contract,19 a vendor remaining in pes 
session is liable for waste committed by him after 
the execution of the contract of sale,20 although 
what will or will not amount to waste necessarily 
depends on what is a reasonable and proper use of 
the property by the vendor according to the circum-
stances of the particular case.21 The purchase? 
may sue to enjoin the vendor from committing 
waste,22 refuse to accept a conveyance unless com-
pensation is made or tendered,23 or, after hw title 
is perfected, sue to recover damages.24 
15. Cal.—Worley v. Nethercott, su-
pra. 
66 C.J. P 1036 note 77. 
16. La.—Valley Camp, W. O. W., v. 
Bethany Lodge. P. & A. M., App., 
190 So. 833. 
Tenn.—Culwell v. Culwell, 133 S.W. 
2d 1009. 23 Tenn.App. 389. 
66 C.J. P 1037 note 80. 
Care of citrus grove 
Under contract for sale of citrus 
grove providing that price was to be 
paid In semiannual installments, and 
that purchasers were required to 
reimburse vendors for money ad-
vanced for care and operation of 
property, purchasers were under no 
obligation properly to care for or cul-
tivate, disc, fertilize, and spray the 
property.—Snidow v. Hill, 197 P.2d 
801, 87 Cal.App.2d 803. 
Instruction held error 
In vendee's action of trespass 
against vendor, who had rented prop-
erty after discovering it had been va-
cated by vendee, to recover one 
month's rent, action of court in in-
structing Jury to return verdict in 
favor of plaintiff for entire amount 
of rent paid by lessee was error.— 
Drane v. Graves, BS S.W.2d 927, 261 
Ky. 787. 
Taxes 
Under contract for sale of citrus 
grove providing that price was to be 
paid in semiannual installments, and 
that terms of agreement were sub-
ject to terms of trust deed, provi-
sions of trust deed for payment of 
taxes and for maintenance and care 
of property were not sufficiently in-
corporated into sales agreement by 
reference to charge purchasers with 
liability for such obligations.—Sni-
dow v. Hill, 187 P.2d 801, 87 Cal.App. 
2d 803. 
Use of adjoining property 
Orai agreement by vendor, that 
purchaser could use gas and water 
pipes and electric lines from adjoin-
ing property of vendor provided pur-
chaser paid her portion of utility 
bills that would accrue, was termina-
ble at will by either party and was 
not enforceable by purchaser or her 
tenant.—Richmond v. Broughton, 
Tex.Civ.App., 190 S.W.2d 842, refused 
for want of merit. 
17. Mass.—Barrel! v. Britton, 138 N. 
E. 579, 244 Mass. 273, 28 A.L.K. 
1065. 
Agreement for purchase price 
An agreement between payee and 
maker of note for purchase price of 
land that payee and his wife should 
have use of rooms occupied by them 
in house on land and half of barn 
thereon, and be furnished firewood by 
maker as long as payee or his wife 
lived, gave them right to live on 
property during their lives and ob-
tain firewood from maker without 
payment therefor, so that maker's 
crossaction for rent and breach of 
contract in action on note by execu-
tor of deceased payee's will was de-
murrable, where wife was still living. 
—Cady v. Cady, 10 S.E.2d 231, 63 Ga. 
App. 191. 
Itoss of vendee's title 
Where at time vendor, holding a 
second lien, rented the property 
which had been vacated by vendee, 
and vendee had lost title by reason 
of the execution of a tax deed, ven-
dee could not maintain an action in 
trespass against vendor, since vendee 
had neither possession nor title.— 
Drane v. Graves, 88 S.W.2d 927. 261 
Ky. 787, 
Punitive damage* 
Where vendor, discovering vendee 
had vacated property which wai-
rapidly depreciating because of aban 
donment, and which was in state of 
considerable disrepair, instituted ac-
tion to enforce lien and after con-
sulting attorney rented property, evi-
dence in vendee's action for treapa**-
was insufficient to authorize instruc-
tion on, or recovery of, punitive darn-
ages.—Drane v. Graves, supra. 
18. Mo.—Parrish v. Hartman, App 
235 S.W. 463, 
19. N.C.—Crawley • . Timberlake. 3? 
N.C. 460. 
Reservation of right to out and re. 
move timber 
Wash.—Rauch v. Zander, 245 P. 17 
138 Wash. 610. 
66 C.J. p 1037 note 85. 
20. Cal.—Kennedy v. Rosecra*?-
Gardens, Inc., 249 P.2d 593. 1H 
Cal.App.2d 87. 
S.D—Foulke v. Suurmeyer, 266 N 
W 151, 64 S.D 267. 
66 C.J. *, 3 037 note 86. 
Where house was destroyed by art 
during period between execution of 
alleged contract of sale and date for 
delivery, purchaser to recover for 
the burning of a house as waste wa* 
required to establish that vrndu* 
caused the fire, either intentionalh 
or negligently.—Osterloh v. Osterloh 
285 N.W. 742, 231 Wis. 319. 
21. N.C—Crawley • . Timberlake, 3T 
N.C. 460. 
66 C.J. p 1037 note 87. 
22. Kan.—Holmberg v. Johnson, 2S 
P. 575, 45 Kan. 197. 
23. Ky.—Durrett v. Simpson's Rep-
resentatives, 3 T.B.Mon. 517, 1C 
Am.D. 115. 
24. Ark.—Newman v. Mountain Park 
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Holder of option may not, after the option is ex-
ercised, sue the vendor in trespass for the cutting 
and removal of timber before the option was exer-
cised.25 There is, however, authority to the con-
trary 26 
b. By Purchaser 
At long as the security of the vendor is not lm. 
paired, a purchaser in possession will not be held liable 
for waste. 
While the rights of the purchaser of land in this 
respect may be either enlarged27 or restricted28 by 
the provisions of the contract, ordinarily, where he 
has a right to possession, he may cut, sell, or remove 
timber29 and will not be enjoined from, or held 
liable for, such acts as the clearing of land and the 
cutting and removal of timber as long as the security 
of the vendor is not impaired thereby.30 The pur-
chaser, however, has no right to commit acts which 
so diminish the value of the property as to impair 
the vendor's security,31 and if he docs so a court of 
equity will protect the rights of the vendor,32 either 
by enjoining the purchaser from committing the 
waste,33 or by the appointment of a receiver,34 
some proceeding to stay the waste and not an action 
for damages being the proper remedy in such cas-
es.35 The purchaser will also be liable for waste 
where he goes into possession wrongfully and with-
out the consent of the vendor,36 or where he remains 
in possession after a rescission or abandonment of 
the contract;37 but one of two joint purchasers is 
not liable for waste which without his knowledge 
or consent is committed by the other.3* 
§ 287. Crops 
The purchaser is the owner of crops planted and 
grown by him ?*c<»pt to the extent that the vendor has 
some right, title, or m u t e s t under the provisions of the 
contract. 
As to the ownership of crops planted or sowed and 
grown by the purchaser in possession under a con-
tract of sale the relation of the vendor and pur-
chaser is said to be analogous to that of landlord 
and tenant39 or of mortgagee and mortgagor in pos-
session ;40 but a particular contract may be so 
worded and construed as to create the relation of 
tenants in common as to the crops.4'1 The pur-
chaser is the owner of such crops42 except to the ex-
Land Co., 107 S.W. 391, 85 Ark. 208. 
122 Am S Pv. 27. 
66 C.J. p 1037 note 90. 
25. G a . ~ V a r n Turpentine A Cattle 
Co. v. Allen & Newton, 144 S.E. 47. 
38 Ga.App. 408. 
26. U.S.—McCarroll v. Newsham, C. 
C.A.La.. 278 P. 4. 
27. Wis .—Hoi le v. Bailey, 17 N.W. 
322. 58 Wit . 434. 
28. Miss .—Leaser v. Dame, 26 So. 
961, 77 Miss. 708. 
66 C.J. p 1037 note 94. 
29. Ala.—Griffin v. State, 2 So.2d 
921, 30 Ala.App. 194. 
66 C.J. p 1037 note 95. 
30. Ala.—Griffin v. State, supra. 
66 C.J. p 1038 note 96. 
31. N\T.—In re De Stuers* Estate . 
99 M . Y S 2 d 739. 190 Misc. 777. 
66 C.J. p 1038 note 97. 
32. W.Va — Spies v. Butts , 53 S.E. 
897, 59 W.Va. 385. 
33. K y . - M a y v. Wil l iams, 60 S.W. 
525. 109 Ky. 682, 22 Ky.L. 1328. 
66 C.J. p 1038 note 99. 
34. W.Va.—Spies v. Butts , 53 S.E. 
897, 59 W.Va. 385. 
35. Wis .—Stauffer v. Eaton, 13 
Ohio 322. 
Wis .—Northrup v. Trask, 39 Wis . 
515. 
36. Minn—C. H. Phinney Land Co. 
v. Cool idge-Schussler Co., 105 N. 
W. 553. 97 Minn. 204. 
66 C.J. p 1038 note 3. 
37. Ky .—Bart l e t t v. Blanton. 4 J.J. 
Marsh. 426. 
N.J.—McKenna v. Reade, 144 A- 812. 
105 N.J.Law 408. 
3 a Ind.—State v. Gramelspacher. 
26 N.E. 81, 126 Ind. 398. 
3d. N.M.—Snipes v. Dexter Gin Co.. 
116 P.2d 1019. 45 N.M. 475. 
66 C.J. p 1039 note 18. 
40. N.M.—Snipes v. Dexter Gin Co.. 
supra. 
66 C.J. p 1039 note 19. 
41. Idaho.—Federal Land Bank of 
Spokane v. McCIoud, 20 P.2d 201. 
51* Idafio 694. 
B igh t to one-half crops 
(1) A contract for the sale of land 
requiring the vendee to del iver one-
half of the crops to the vendor Is 
sufficiently complied with If the ven-
dee makes del ivery of the grain to 
the elevator a s belonging to the ven-
dor.—Dimmitt Elevator Co. v. Car-
ter, Tex.Civ.App.. 70 S.W.2d 615. 
(2) An e levator company buying 
wheat from a vendee in possess ion 
without actual notice of a contract 
provision g iv ing the vendor the right 
to one-half of the crops Is not liable 
to the vendor for conversion, where 
such contract was not recorded.— 
Dimmitt Elevator Co. v. Carter, su-
pra. 
42. Mont.—Hanson v. Lancaster . 
226 P.2d 105. 124 Mont. 441—Ham-
ilton v. Rock. 191 P.2d 663, 121 
Mont. 245—Kester v. Amon, 261 P. 
288, 81 Mont. 1, fol lowed In Bak-
ken v. Kester, 261 P. 294, 81 Mont. 
18. 
N\M.—Snipes v. Dexter Gin Co., 116 
P.2d 1019, 45 N.M. 475. 
Tex .—Dimmit t Elevator Co. • . Car-
ter, Civ.App.. 70 S.W 2d 615. 
Wash.—Loudon v Cooper. 100 P.2d 
4 2. 3 Wash.2d 229—Short v. Short, 
40 P.2d 752. 180 Wash. 614. 
66 C.J. p 1039 note 21. 
Conversion 
(1) Vendor's refusal to al low pur-
chaser to take hay to which purchas-
er r ightful ly held title, and vendor's 
se l l ing of hay to another const i tuted 
a conversion.—Goff v. Fi les . 174 A. 
901. 133 Me. 157, 95 A.L.R. 1123. 
(2) Statement In record that re-
fusal of vendor to al low purchaser 
to take hay Is conversion claimed 
sufficiently alleged demand, which 
warranted Inference that refusal was 
In consequence of s demand, or that 
there was such refusal as to waive 
necess i ty of a demand.—Coff v. F i les , 
supra, 
Crop mortgagee 
(1) In action between conditional 
vendor and holder of mortgage on 
crops given by conditional purchas-
ers of land, where purchasers re-
mained in possession after condition-
al sale contract had been terminated 
and were in possess ion at time of 
harvest , crop mortgagee was enti -
tled to proceeds, since purchasers 
were holding as tenants adverse to 
owners .—Scott v. California Farm-
ing Co., 40 P.2d 850, 4 Cal.App.2d 232. 
(2) Vendor, who waived forfeiture 
of conditional contract to sell land by 
accept ing an ass ignment of purchas-
er's interest In the land wi th knowl-
edge that purchasers had executed 
a mortgage on the crops to another. 
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